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1. In his book Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy (Hacker 1996), 
P.M.S.Hacker set up a very sharp opposition between Wittgenstein and analytic philosophy, on the 
one side, and Anglo-American philosophy drawing inspiration from Quine on the other. As a way of 
identifying analytic philosophy, the opposition is unconvincing: Hacker rightly insists on the 
diversity of the analytic tradition, pointing out that different notions of philosophy’s role and even 
different notions of analysis prevailed with different philosophers at different moments. But then, he 
wants to exclude Quine and other philosophers he regards as Quinean from the analytic tradition, 
without it being quite clear why the cleavage between Quine and the later Wittgenstein, or between 
Quine and Austin, should be so much wider or more crucial than the difference between, say, 
Austin and Russell (who are both included in the tradition).  
 Anyway, in drawing the opposition Hacker focusses on one aspect that I would also like to 
concentrate upon. According to him, post-Quinean philosophy appears to be dominated by “modes 
of thought that emulate the forms of scientific theories, the jargon and formalization of respectable 
science, without the constraints of systematic data collecting, quantitative methods and 
experimental testing” (p.266); whereas analytic philosophy properly so called always conceived of 
itself as being other than science1, and the later Wittgenstein insisted that the attempt to emulate 
or ape natural science typically produces bad philosophy. In Hacker’s own words, 
 
A fundamental tenet of analytic philosophy, from its post-Tractatus phase onwards, was that 
there is a sharp distinction between philosophy and science. Philosophy…whether or not it is 
conceived to be a cognitive discipline, is conceived to be a priori and hence discontinuous with, 
and methodologically distinct from, science. Similarly, analytic philosophy in general held that 
questions of meaning antecede questions of truth, and are separable from empirical questions 
of fact. If Quine is right, then analytic philosophy was fundamentally mistaken. 
 
Now, indicting post-Quinean philosophy for rejecting any sharp demarcation with respect to 
science (i.e. for seeing itself as continuous with science) is not the same as indicting it for being 
pseudo-science, or, to borrow Putnam’s word 2, parascience. Hacker does not seem to distinguish 
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clearly between the two charges. That one doesn’t recognize a sharp divide between philosophy 
and science doesn’t seem to entail the assertion that philosophy just is science (that baldness is 
vague does not entail that everybody is bald); even less does it oblige one to practice philosophy 
as quasi-science, i.e. as something that imitates certain superficial features of genuine science, 
though it is not really science. These are three different things: the continuity of philosophy with 
science, the identity of philosophy with science (or, perhaps more plausibly, the inclusion of 
philosophy within science), and the faking of science by philosophy. What I particularly want to 
underscore is that continuity –the lack of  a sharp demarcation- entails neither identity nor partial 
identity, i.e. inclusion. Analogously, political theory is not the same as politics, yet a particular 
speech or a particular essay by a political leader can be both a piece of political theorizing and a 
political act – an act of practical politics. Or again, theoretical physics is not the same as 
mathematics; however, there are contibutions that one wouldn’t know where to range, whether in 
physics or in mathematics. Moreover, if we take relevance as a criterion of continuity, so that 
discipline A is continuous with B if there are results of B that can be appealed to in order to 
establish theses belonging to A –perhaps not a bad way of identifying continuity- then many 
sciences turn out to be continuous with many others: biology with chemistry, sociology with 
psychology, perhaps every natural science with physics. Thus continuity does not seem to imply 
identity or inclusion.  
 
2. It scarcely needs arguing that Wittgenstein, early and late3, strongly opposed both the idea that 
philosophy is part of science, or one of the sciences, and the idea that philosophy is in any way 
analogous to science. Perhaps Wittenstein would have agreed with Putnam in addressing the 
charge of “parascience” against several of today's philosophers: for example, against philosophers 
working in the neighbourhood of cognitive science such as Jerry Fodor, Ruth Millikan, or Daniel 
Dennett4. On the other hand, his opposition to the idea of continuity is not equally clear, not 
immediately at any rate. Ultimately, I will claim that Wittgenstein did indeed reject both the idea of 
continuity and the arguments supporting it. It is, however, interesting to examine such arguments 
together with Wittgenstein’s reasons for rejecting them, for it allows us to highlight some crucial 
points that are relevant to the structure of today’s philosophical discussion. In this article, I will first 
sketch what I take to be two Quinean arguments for the continuity of philosophy with science. In 
each case, I will present Wittgenstein’s reasons for not accepting  the argument. I will conclude 
that the Quinean arguments are ineffective from Wittgenstein’s point of view. Next, I will ask three 
separate though related questions: (a) where do Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophical views 
essentially diverge, (b) did Wittgenstein have an  argument against the continuity of science with 
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philosophy, (c) did Wittgenstein really believe, to the very end of his philosophical career, that 
scientific results are philosophically irrelevant. It will be seen that all three questions are related 
with Wittgenstein’s distinction  between conceptual and factual issues. I will then conclude that the 
opposition between Quinean philosophy and Wittgensteinian philosophy is quite real. I do not 
intend to provide a solution to the problem (or family of problems) on which they took opposite 
sides; I only want to bring out the structure of their disagreement. 
 So, let us first look at Quine’s arguments for the continuity of philosophy with science. In 
“Natural Kinds”, while discussing the legitimacy of appealing to empirical generalizations or to 
scientific theories such as Darwin’s in order to justify a philosophical principle, Quine says the 
following: 
 
I see philosophy not as an a priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science, but as continuous 
with science. I see philosophy and science as in the same boat – a boat which, to revert to 
Neurath’s figure as I so often do, we can rebuild only at sea while staying afloat in it. There is no 
external vantage point, no first philosophy. All scientific findings, all scientific conjectures that 
are at present plausible, are therefore in my view as welcome for use in philosophy as 
elsewhere (Quine 1969b, pp.126-7). 
 
As Barry Stroud pointed out (1995, p.38), Quine never made clear which conception of philosophy 
he believed he was attacking here or in other similar texts, i.e. what we should understand by an ‘a 
priori propaedeutic’ or by ‘first philosophy’. Perhaps, as Stroud suggests and Hacker would gladly 
go along with, he had in mind  “something that philosophers for many years certainly said they 
were doing, or said they ought to be doing: “analyzing” the concepts and principles of science or of 
everyday life…an a priori unpacking of the empty form or structure of our thought, or the discovery 
of the formal principles which any respectable inquiry must follow, quite independently of whatever 
“content” might come to fill that form” (ib.). Maybe Quine was thinking of some such Kantian 
enterprise. On the other hand, sticking to the letter of what he says and keeping in mind the 
positivistic legacy that lies at the root of his reflection, it is more plausible to suppose that he is 
distancing himself from a puristic conception of philosophy: i.e. a conception on which no empirical 
or factual assumption has a legitimate place in a philosophical argument. The crucial expression in 
the text I quoted is ‘external vantage point’: a puristic conception of philosophy appears to 
presuppose an external vantage point, what he elsewhere called “cosmic exile”5. Positivism is 
relevant here, for Quine’s view can be seen as a radicalization of Carnap’s thesis of the 
meaninglessness, or “lack of cognitive content”, of so-called external questions6. It is well known 
that Carnap regarded questions that are not raised within some language –questions, i.e., that do 
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not presuppose the rules of some language or other- as more or less disguised questions 
concerning the aptness of adopting one language rather than another (a practical, not a theoretical 
issue according to Carnap). Such questions, e.g. ‘Are there numbers?’, are not amenable to a 
formulation “in terms of the common scientific language” (ib.). Quine’s view can be seen as 
Carnap’s view minus the conventionalist framework that Carnap was taking for granted. Like 
Carnap, Quine believes  that all meaningful questions presuppose the rules of some language or 
other (there is no external standpoint, no cosmic exile); unlike Carnap, however, Quine regards it 
as mistaken even to imagine oneself in a position of uncertainty, or indeterminacy, or freedom of 
choice among different languages (where, as Carnap says, no meaningful questions could be 
asked). For we are all the time speaking within a language, our common language, which is the 
background of all scientific theories. To be sure, Quine is not talking in terms of the rules of a 
language –he is not saying that any meaningful question presupposes the rules of some language- 
for he regards the distinction between rules and statements or propositions as dubious, and that 
since the mid-Thirties7. Thus taking a language for granted, or speaking from within a language, 
does not amount to presupposing the rules of that language as opposed to presupposing the truth 
of certain statements couched in that language. 
 Thus it appears that, for Quine, rejecting the idea of a first philosophy does not so much 
amount to rejecting transcendentalism (the “a priori unpacking of the empty form or structure of our 
thought”, in Stroud’s words), nor does it exactly coincide with rejecting epistemological 
foundationalism (“the discovery of the formal principles which any respectable inquiry must follow”). 
What Quine is rejecting is, more generally, the idea that one could do philosophy without assuming 
whatever presuppositions are implicit in the adoption of a language; or perhaps we should say, in 
order to avoid all conventionalistic overtones, that they are implicit in the very fact of having, and 
using, a language. Occasionally, Quine referred to such presuppositions by the phrase ‘conceptual 
scheme’ (Davidson’s Third Dogma). We inevitably speak and argue from within a conceptual 
scheme. Consequently, Quine concludes, we might as well go all the way: 
 
No inquiry being possible without some conceptual scheme, we may as well retain and use the 
best one we know – right down to the latest detail of quantum mechanics, if we know it and it 
matters (1960, p.4). 
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This is, then,  Quine’s essential motivation for the continuity of philosophy with science: as we are 
anyway speaking and arguing from within some conceptual scheme –our conceptual scheme- we 
might as well exploit the whole of science, “right down to the latest detail of quantum mechanics”. 
Notice that Quine is not here saying that, speaking as we are from within our conceptual 
scheme, we are as a matter of fact assuming the whole of science and we simply ought to 
acknowledge the fact. That would be an obvious non sequitur: it is surely not immediately clear that 
the adoption of any conceptual scheme whatever involves the adoption of science, indeed, of the 
whole of science. And it would be odd for Quine to claim that our  conceptual scheme involves the 
whole of science: scientific knowledge, with or without quantum mechanics, is neither so 
widespread nor so effectively influential to be plausibly regarded as part of our conceptual scheme. 
In this respect, the literary tradition of the West (within which science only plays a minor role) would 
be a more plausible candidate. Anyway, Quine is not claiming that science is our conceptual 
scheme, or part of it; Quine is saying, rather, that we would do well  to adopt science as our 
conceptual scheme, for, as conceptual schemes go, it is the best available.  
One could object to Quine that the grounds he gives for the adoption of science as a 
conceptual scheme do not really justify such a commitment. Granted, we are anyway speaking and 
arguing from within a conceptual scheme - our conceptual scheme. But why should we saddle 
ourselves with the whole of science, down to the latest details of quantum mechanics, rather than 
keeping our conceptual-schematic commitments to a minimum? Can't we rest content with 
adhering to the grammar and semantics of our mother tongue (which does not appear to involve 
explicit or tacit knowledge of quantum mechanics)? The common ground of philosophical 
discourse -it could be argued- is, and ought to be simply our semantic competence: there is no 
reason to load philosophical discourse with all sorts of obscure, little known, and often 
controversial presuppositions. 
 However, such a prima facie reasonable objection clashes with a now long tradition of 
philosophical arguments challenging the distinction between semantic competence and the 
acceptance of theories. An early and crucial episode in that tradition was Quine’s own article Two 
Dogmas of Empiricism, with the criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction and the connected 
claim that there cannot be any principled reason to exclude any statement from counting for or 
against the truth of any other statement (confirmation holism). If one goes along with Quine’s 
rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction, then semantic competence cannot be identified with 
knowledge of certain truths as opposed to full-fledged scientific knowledge. Notice, however, that 
such is the case only if semantic competence is identified with some kind of propositional 
knowledge to begin with. Wittgenstein, for one, did not see the matter along such lines at all: for 
him, semantic competence was rather to be equated with a practical ability, the command of 
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certain rules. Carnap, on the other hand, had interpreted semantic competence in terms of 
knowledge of meaning postulates (plus logic): this is the conception of semantic competence that 
Quine is challenging by his criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction. I.e., Quine shows –if he is 
right in his criticism- that semantic competence à la Carnap cannot be demarcated from general 
knowledge. His criticism is not immediately effective against a different conception of semantic 
competence, such as Wittgenstein’s. But on the other hand, we saw that Quine himself doubted 
that the command of rules could plausibly be contrasted with the acceptance of certain 
propositions as true:8 for him, adhering to certain rules must consist, ultimately, in taking certain 
propositions to be true. So Wittgenstein would have seen no reason to regard Quine’s criticism of 
the analytic/synthetic distinction as a challenge to the opposition of semantic competence and 
factual knowledge (including, of course, scientific knowledge), while Quine, in turn, would not 
regard Wittgenstein’s notion of competence as safe from his criticism. 
 Thus, according to Quine, we cannot easily identify the shared ground of philosophical 
argument with common semantic competence as opposed to more or less controversial scientific 
theories. It then becomes more plausible to hold that, as we are bound to be involved with all sorts 
of factual assumptions anyway, we might as well buy the whole lot, i.e. science to the latest detail 
of quantum mechanics. Such a conclusion is reinforced by the second main point of Two Dogmas, 
i.e. confirmation holism. If any statement can be relevant to the confirmation or disconfirmation of 
any other (at least in principle), it follows that scientific statements can be relevant to philosophical 
arguments. It is, of course, assumed that there are philosophical arguments; more precisely, it is 
presupposed that philosophical research aims at establishing theses. If there are philosophical 
theses that are up for confirmation or disconfirmation, then confirmation holism instructs us not to 
rule out any statement –not even quantum-mechanical statements- as possibly relevant. However, 
as is well known, this is not how Wittgenstein saw the matter. 
 
In philosophy we do not draw conclusions -he wrote in the Investigations- “But it must be like 
this!” is not a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone admits. 
(Philosophical Investigations, § 599) 
 
It is not so much that there are no philosophical theses; it’s rather that there are no controversial 
philosophical theses, theses that one could think of giving grounds for by appealing to this or that 
fact, perhaps to this or that scientific result. Whenever something controversial is stated in 
philosophy, that is a sure sign that something went amiss in the philosopher’s work. Now, there is 
the temptation not to take such pronouncements of Wittgenstein’s seriously; one is tempted to say 
that such a contention cannot be upheld, and that Wittgenstein’s own philosophical work does not 
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bear it out9. I believe the temptation should be resisted, whether or not we eventually agree with 
Wittgenstein on this, and whether or not Wittgenstein himself actually stood by his tenet. 
Wittgenstein’s controversial thesis that there are no controversial theses in philosophy is of a piece 
with much else in his philosophy, for example, with his adoption of the “morphological method”.10 
And if we take him seriously on this, then Quine’s continuity argument based on confirmation 
holism is devoid of any efficacy, from Wittgenstein’s standpoint. 
 
3. We found in Quine two arguments for the continuity of philosophy with science. The first is 
based on the impossibility of cosmic exile and the rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction: it is 
only plausible, at least prima facie, if semantic competence is a form of propositional knowledge. 
The second derives from confirmation holism, and it requires that philosophy be conceived as an 
argumentative discipline, in which theses are put forth and accepted or rejected, depending on the 
evidence. Neither presupposition was acceptable to Wittgenstein, so this is, in a sense, the end of 
the story. However, there are three more points I would like to raise. 
 First point. It is quite clear that Wittgenstein shared some of the premises of Quine’s first 
argument. There is a sense of ‘first philosophy’ in which Wittgenstein, like Quine, does not believe 
in “first philosophy”: he does not believe in what he calls ‘metaphilosophy’, or philosophy before 
philosophy.11 Like Quine, Wittgenstein does not believe that philosophy could start by shaping its 
tools – concepts such as ‘rule’, ‘proposition’, or ‘language’ -  in some pre-theoretical or meta-
theoretical space (“cosmic exile”, in Quine’s terminology). On the contrary, philosophy essentially 
takes the ordinary use of such concepts for granted: that ordinary usage has no precise 
boundaries does not make such concepts less viable for philosophy than they are for everyday life 
(Philosophical Grammar, §73). Like Quine, Wittgenstein regards ordinary language as the 
background of philosophical discourse: the concepts that philosophy employs are ordinary words in 
their ordinary use: “When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language 
of every day”, he says (Philosophical Investigations, §120). Where, then, do they part company 
exactly? Or, rather, why does Quine want to include science –indeed, the whole of science- in what 
he calls ‘our conceptual scheme’, whereas Wittgenstein will have none of that? Why are the results 
of science -scientific propositions- of no special interest for philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, 
although he admits that ours is “a community which is bound together by science and education” 
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(On Certainty, §298)?  We already saw Quine’s reasons to some extent. Wittgenstein’s reasons 
are to be found in his definition of philosophy as a grammatical enterprise. Most of the time, 
science is for Wittgenstein just a collection of factual hypotheses that have no grammatical import, 
and therefore are of no interest for philosophy. More precisely, their grammatical import is 
independent of their truth or falsity: whatever grammatical import a scientific statement may 
possess is shared by its negation. This is one consequence of philosophy’s “transition from the 
question of truth to the question of meaning”12. Obviously, this presupposes exactly the sort of 
distinction between the conceptual and the factual that Quine denies. 
 Thus, even Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s agreement on ordinary language as the background 
of philosophy is deceptive to some extent. For Quine, acquiescing in ordinary language13 does not 
involve ordinary concepts more than, or as opposed to, ordinary truths (and there is no sharp line 
to be drawn between such ordinary truths and less ordinary truths, such as scientific truths). For 
Wittgenstein, to start with everyday language is to start with our customary use of ordinary words in 
everyday life (and as part of everyday life): it is not to start with some body of common sense 
knowledge –such as could be represented by G.E.Moore’s truisms – for which the question could 
arise of its continuity, or discontinuity, with scientific knowledge. 
 Aside from not accepting Quine’s argument for the continuity of philosophy with science, 
does Wittgenstein have an argument against it? This is the second point I would like to raise. The 
answer is that he does have such an argument. It is based on the principle that “Nothing is 
hidden”14: the “data” that philosophy needs are all under our eyes. In philosophy we never need to 
wait until certain facts are established; there are neither discoveries nor surprises in philosophy. 
Wittgenstein says, 
 
What is hidden is of no interest to us. One might give the name “philosophy” to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions. (Philosophical Investigations, §126) 
 
If scientific results were relevant to philosophy, then there could be discoveries in philosophy, or 
something in philosophy could depend on a discovery: something in philosophy could be one way 
or the other depending on whether science has established, or discovered, that things are thus and 
so rather than otherwise. However, it can never be crucial for philosophy that facts are one way 
rather than the other, for, as we already saw, philosophy deals with possibilities, not with facts;  its 
investigations are grammatical, not factual. As he went back to the Tractatus in the early Thirties, 
Wittgenstein denounced the “dogmatism” of his former theory of elementary propositions and 
logical analysis precisely because it made logic dependent on the discovery of certain facts; in that 
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case, facts concerning the form of elementary propositions.15 The logical notions of analysis and 
elementary proposition had to wait for their full determination until “further research” had 
determined what the bottom level of reality was, and, consequently, what an elementary 
proposition looked like. According to the later Wittgenstein, this stemmed from a total 
misunderstanding of the nature of philosophical research: 
 
The truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and we have got it actually 
present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in the realm of the grammar of our 
ordinary language, and this grammar is already there. Thus we have already got everything and 
need not wait for the future (Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis, p.183). 
 
The conceptual domain – the “realm of grammar”- is not something that science could make 
discoveries about, for two reasons: first of all, because it is entirely open to view, so that it is not 
something that one could think of discovering anything about (“Nothing is hidden”); secondly, 
because science only discovers facts, and facts – their being one way or the other – are 
grammatically indifferent. The only philosophical use of scientific discoveries is to make the 
philosopher better aware of possibilities: 
 
Is scientific progress useful for philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered lighten 
the philosopher’s task, imagining possibilities (Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, I, 
§807)[Variant: Realities are so many possibilities for the philosopher]. 
 
Thus, even Wittgenstein’s argument against the continuity of philosophy with science ultimately 
depends on the dichotomy between the conceptual and the factual: it’s because philosophy is 
confined to the conceptual that, as far as philosophy is concerned, “nothing is hidden”.  
 
4. But then, are facts – their being one way or the other – really indifferent for grammar, hence for 
philosophy? This is the third and last point I would like to raise. The very late Wittgenstein – the 
author of On Certainty – appears to have had occasional doubts about the philosophical 
irrelevance of facts. It is sometimes pointed out that, in the notes On Certainty, certain facts 
acquire grammatical import, at least in the sense that they are assumed or presupposed by a 
language game, so that e.g. calling them in question is not really compatible with playing that 
particular game. It is perhaps not entirely clear whether the facts themselves are regarded as 
preconditions of the language game (On Certainty, §618), or our certainty that such facts hold (OC 
§§446, 519, 579); but anyway, Wittgenstein appears to be saying that certain facts, as laid out e.g. 
by physics (OC §600) or anatomy (OC §666), play a special role – a role that is close to that of a 
rule. Propositions expressing such facts –we are tempted to call them ‘basic’ propositions- are like 
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rules in that they are as well-founded as any grounds one could give for them (OC §111), and also 
in that they cannot be given up “without giving up all judgment” (or so one would be inclined to 
say)(OC §494). Perhaps, Wittgenstein says, there is no sharp boundary between propositions of 
logic and empirical propositions (OC §319); perhaps “the same proposition may get treated at one 
time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing” (OC §98).  
 All this is quite well known. And the conclusion is easily drawn that the very late 
Wittgenstein was indeed relaxing the distinction between the conceptual and the factual, between 
rules and propositions, or between grammar and experience, thereby coming closer to views such 
as Quine’s (or Davidson’s). Given enough time, he would have been brought to regard much of 
natural science as having grammatical import, hence to the continuity of philosophy with science.  
 As a speculation concerning the possible evolution of Wittgenstein’s thought, this is of 
course untestable. However, as an interpretation of what Wittgenstein, even very late, did actually 
say it is, I believe, one-sided and misses at least one important point. Wittgenstein is not saying 
that the facts of nature – “facts of (our) natural history”, as he calls them – are constitutive of 
concepts; he is saying that they motivate our particular use of certain concepts within particular 
language games. Let us read once more a very famous text in the Investigations, Part II: 
 
I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different 
concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are 
absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something 
that we realize – then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from 
what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become 
intelligible to him. (PI II xii). 
 
That footrules are rigid, for example, does not determine our concept of measurement, but if they 
were not rigid a different notion of measurement would probably prevail. Here, the important point 
is that it would still be a notion of measurement, though different from ours. When Wittgenstein 
says that “we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes” (PI II xii), he appears to be 
suggesting that what is important for philosophy are the several possibilities of employment of 
certain words and the circumstances in which such employments could turn out to be motivated 
and “natural”; not which of such circumstances do hold, which natural history is the true one. What 
contributes to the clarification of a concept such as pain, for example, is an examination of the 
different uses the word ‘pain’ can be put to for different purposes or in widely different 
circumstances, both natural and social; not, in and of itself, the association of our use of ‘pain’ with 
our physical and psychical constitution. Once again, philosophy is concerned with possibilities, not 
with actualities: the actual facts of nature –even “very general” facts- are not in themselves 
philosophically crucial. Reference to facts of nature does not settle philosophical disputes: it is a 
heuristic device whose purpose and effect is to make us realize the contingency of even the 
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deepest features of our use of language. This makes science useful for philosophy – as the 
quotation about scientific discoveries clearly shows – but not continuous with philosophy, in the 
sense that scientific results could be premises to philosophical conclusions. Science stimulates 
philosophical fantasy, it does not establish, or help establish, philosophical conclusions (there are 
no such things, anyway).  
 Here, an objection could be raised against Wittgenstein. If philosophy is essentially 
interested in our own use of language (for, after all, that is where the philosophical malady is 
generated) then it would seem to be philosophically crucial that one particular natural history is 
true, rather than another – for example, one of the imaginary histories that Wittgenstein is fond of 
telling. For, when all comparisons and contrasts have been set up and duly experienced in 
imagination, it is after all in the light of the facts of our natural history that we make sense of our 
use of language. Suppose we were utterly ignorant of such facts: suppose we didn’t know whether 
footrules are rigid or not; or whether people usually remember their names, or only occasionally, or 
never; or whether physical bodies keep disappearing and reappearing rather than just being there 
most of the time. There may be something –perhaps a lot- that we could say about language under 
such a veil of ignorance, but we could hardly make sense of our use of language. Not knowing 
whether footrules are rigid or not, for example, we would entirely miss the point of our use of 
concepts of measurement. Counting the way we count in a world of stable objects is one thing, 
counting in the same way in a world of vanishing objects is a different thing. And so forth. So it 
seems that the facts being one way rather than another does make a difference, if philosophy is 
intended to make sense of our use of language. 
 Wittgenstein might have conceded this point; however, he would have argued that the 
rigidity of rulers, or the relative permanence of everyday objects, can hardly be seen as facts that 
science establishes; rather, science itself presupposes such “facts”. Therefore, their putative 
philosophical relevance does not involve the philosophical relevance of science – of scientific 
propositions, or of the facts such propositions are meant to establish.  Quine, in turn, would point 
out that what we have here is just one more difference of degree: it is not easy to separate the 
facts that science (as a whole) presupposes from the facts that science establishes. Wittgenstein, 
on the other hand,16  saw the difference between the bed of the river and the water flowing in it as 
one of kind, not of degree (OC §§97, 99). So, once more, what is in question is the distinction 
between two kinds of propositions, whatever the two kinds are called. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16
 As Roger Gibson recently noted: Gibson 1996, p.93. 
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